This article examines the link between uncertainty and investors' reaction to goodwill write-offs (GWWOs) for a sample of French firms during the period 2001-2004 Our theoretical setting is derived from Daniel, Hirshleifer and Subrahmanyam (1998, hereafter DHS98) who posit that overconfidence leads to an overreaction to private information, followed by too little adjustments when the information becomes public and then a long adjustment which reduce slowly the mispricing in the long run. We consider three proxies for uncertainty -stock return volatility, analyst coverage and dispersion in analyst forecasts -and sort two samples of GWWOs according to the level of uncertainty. Our results confirm DHS98 model and, indirectly, that overconfidence is boosted by uncertainty. We identify a particular corporate event -here a bad signal: goodwill write-offs -and a particular context -high uncertainty -that fit DHS98 model, allowing private information prospecting, overconfidence in this information and arbitrage obstacles. Our tests confirm the overconfidence effect on investors' reaction: the high-uncertainty sample is characterized by strongly negative abnormal returns during the period preceding GWWOs announcement, associated with high volatility. At the announcement date, negative abnormal returns are observed in line with the selfattribution bias effect (the overreaction is strengthened by a confirming signal). The overreaction to private information is corrected in the long run, where we observe positive abnormal returns, creating a reversal. No abnormal returns are observed for the low-uncertainty sample. This study offers interesting insights in two ways: (i) in the area of financial markets and efficiency, it provides a test of a major over-and under-reaction model, (ii) in the area of corporate finance and accounting, it helps to explain investors' reaction to corporate financial disclosure according to a theoretical approach of information process and inference.
Corporate disclosure, information uncertainty and investors' behavior: A test of the overconfidence effect on market reaction to goodwill write-offs
The information policy of firms has been the subject of an important stream of literature focusing on management motives for voluntary disclosure, regulation and the role of auditors and intermediaries in the disclosure process, capital market consequences of corporate reporting and disclosure (Healy and Palepu [2001] ). Understanding investors' response to new information is probably the main question assessed by managers facing disclosure decisions. There is substantial evidence of anomalies in market responses to corporate announcements. The behavioral finance literature has proposed two contradictory models of investors' behavior. In the first approach, investors overreact to information, leading to long-term reversals. In the second approach, investors underreact to information, leading to long-term returns continuation. Two phenomena underlie the mispricing story: agents (or some agents) are not fully rational and these agents can influence security price due to limits to arbitrage (« the two building blocks of behavioral finance », Barberis and Thaler [2002] ). Irrationality leads to mispricing and its correction is costly and risky when limits to arbitrage occur, allowing mispricing survival 1 . Hirshleifer [2001] and Subramanyam [1998, 2001] posit that uncertainty intensifies psychological biases. It also strengthens limits of arbitrage opportunities because homogenous classes of risk are harder to identify. Zhang [2006] shows that information uncertainty contributes to investors' underreaction to new information. Hence a paradoxical effect occurs: uncertainty creates a higher demand for corporate information but could emphasize mispricing. In a managerial point of view, understanding the process and the consequences of this effect is particularly important in voluntary disclosure decisions and in announcement timing.
In this paper we focus on investors' response to private and public information. We analyse investors' reaction to goodwill write-offs (hereafter GWWOs) according to the level of uncertainty prior to the announcement, for a sample of French firms during the period [2001] [2002] [2003] [2004] . Our theoretical setting is based on the overconfidence effect as formulated by Daniel, Hirshleifer and Subrahmanyam [1998, hereafter DHS98] . DHS98 model shows that overconfident investors overreact to their private information, leading to an underreaction when the information becomes public. When considering overconfidence in a dynamic way, in the sense that confirming news boost overconfidence, public information can increase overconfidence and intensify overreaction (i.e. mispricing continuation).
A GWWO announcement is typically a bad news that could be anticipated by an informed investor with expertise and research about the firm and the industry. It offers a relevant situation where informed and non-informed investors can co-exist, before a public announcement. Psychological literature suggests that individuals tend to be more overconfident in situations that require more judgement to evaluate. Experts are prone to overconfidence in particular when predictability is low and evidence is ambiguous (Griffin and Tversky [1992] ). When uncertainty is high, agents tend to construct scenarios and are overconfident on their probability of success (or planning fallacy - Kahneman and Tversky [1979] ). An important effect of uncertainty is a higher incentive to collect private information. As discussed in DHS98, individuals place too much weight on information they collect themselves and so tend to overestimate the precision of this information. A second important effect of uncertainty is in strengthening limits of arbitrage. Hirshleifer [2001 Hirshleifer [ , p.1539 points out that arbitrage is more difficult for risky securities because it supposes to detect mispricing and to anticipate what other investors have yet detected and then act upon it. Shleifer and Vishny [1997] argue that volatility makes arbitrage less attractive. This suggests that arbitrage could be harder when uncertainty is higher. Hence, uncertainty intensifies overconfidence and limits arbitrage ability 2 .
We consider three proxies for uncertainty -stock return volatility, analyst coverage and dispersion in analyst forecasts -and sort two samples of GWWOs according to the level of uncertainty. If the stock market response to information is due to overconfidence, the price response will be in line with DHS98 predictions for high-uncertainty firms.
This study offers interesting insights in two ways: (i) in the area of financial markets and efficiency, it provides a test of a major over-and under-reaction model, (ii) in the area of corporate finance and accounting, it helps to explain investors' reaction to corporate financial disclosure according to a theoretical approach of information process and inference.
The paper is organized as follows. Section 1 presents hypotheses according to DHS98 model. Section 2 describes the data set, the measurement of variables and the samples selection. Section 3 reports the empirical results. Moreover, he/she updates his/her own ability in a biased manner: the auto-attribution bias means that he/she attaches too much (little) significance to confirming (disconfirming) public information. These two biases have two consequences. Firstly, overconfident investors overreact to private information, i.e. prices move during a period preceding the public announcement and are on average partially reversed in the long run. During the overreaction period, overconfidence causes price to move away from fundamentals, thereby causing excess price volatility, as in Odean [1998] .
Background, research design and hypotheses
Overconfidence also leads to underweight the public signal, which tends to reduce volatility at the announcement date. Secondly, according to self-attribution bias, if public information confirms the private signal, confidence and overreaction are intensified when public news arrives and this is followed by a long-run correction. If not, confidence decreases by little or remains constant.
Corporate disclosure and value relevance of goodwill write-offs
According to Dumontier and Raffournier [2002] , firms release more and more frequently voluntary information. In their European survey on accounting and capital markets, they point out several topics related to market response to accounting disclosure that remain highly relevant for future research, including empirical studies on The high-uncertainty hypothesis is illustrated in the following figure:
Hypothesis for high uncertainty sub-sample: overreaction to private information and underreaction to public announcement However, market reaction may be related to the magnitude of GWWO (Li et al. [2004] ):
we may observe that larger impairment losses produce higher negative abnormal returns. This effect could moderate the overconfidence effect, but we primarily expect a difference between high-and low-uncertainty sub-samples, and control for the effect of GWWO size.
Data, sample, and variable measures
From the database Lexis-Nexis, we have collected more than 800 newspaper releases mentioning words related to write-offs on the French market for the period 2001-2004.
We then eliminate non goodwill write-offs and multiple events, and obtain 75 GWWOs announcements. After matching with I/B/E/S and Amadeus databases (respectively used for two proxies of uncertainty and firms and GWWOs size), 62 events remain in the sample.
Two sub-samples are sorted by uncertainty. We use three usual proxies for uncertainty:
return volatility (VOL), analysts' coverage (NB or number of analysts supplying a forecast in a given month) and analyst forecasts dispersion (SD or standard deviation of forecasts in a given month). Volatility is estimated by standard deviation of raw returns Expected cumulated abnormal returns
Time

Private info
Rational reaction to private information Overreaction to private information and underreaction at the public announcement followed by a long-run correction (overconfidence effect)
Overconfidence and self attribution bias effects GWWO annoucement from 10 days to 250 days before the event date. Coverage and forecasts dispersion are extracted from the I/B/E/S summary database. These two variables vary across different months of a same year: coverage is higher and dispersion lower just before earnings announcement. So, we need a measure before the GWWO announcement (because GWWO can reduce uncertainty) but with respect to the homogeneity constraint due to different earnings release across firms. We use the earnings announcement preceding the GWWO announcement and extract NB and SD from the month prior to this earnings announcement. We exclude firms with less than three forecasts during this month.
From these three proxies we construct an uncertainty index. Each firm has been ranked among the whole sample for each uncertainty proxy. The index (noted UNCINDEX) is the equally weighted average of the three ranks. By construction, a low value of the index represents a high information uncertainty (high forecasts dispersion, low coverage, high return volatility). We exclude the median decile to limit ambiguous classification and split the sample into two groups: high (low) uncertainty group is composed of 28 (29) firms for which the value of the index is low (high). These two sub-samples are respectively noted high-U and low-U. Table 1 reports descriptive statistics about the global index and each uncertainty proxy.
[table 1 here]
An event study is conducted to investigate the market reaction to the write-off announcement. Stock prices are extracted from Euronext database. SBF250 index is used for assessing the market return. Short-and long-run returns are measured from the GWWO announcement date (date 0). For short-term performance we estimate marketmodel-adjusted abnormal returns. We calculate betas by using Scholes and Williams' 
Empirical results
[table 2 here]
The mean write-off represents 21,4% of fixed assets. The significantly higher mean relative to median is consistent with a few firms with very high amount of impairment losses, particularly in the high-U sub-sample. For the whole sample, abnormal returns at the announcement are negative (-1,57%) confirming value relevance of GWWOs and previous results. In the one-year period preceding the announcement, the marketadjusted cumulative average abnormal return (BH250-) for the overall sample is largely negative, confirming Hirshey and Richardson [2003] study. Such pre-announcement findings could be explained in two ways: managers choose to recognize impairment losses after a prolonged period of market underperformance, or investors anticipated the impairment loss prior to its actual recognition by companies. The most important result in table 1 is that returns for the whole sample are entirely driven by the high-U subsample. According to the uncertainty effect, the second explanation seems more plausible: a higher uncertainty induces a higher incentive to collect information and then a higher anticipation. We discuss the other explanation -uncertainty as a managerial motive for signaling -at the end of the article with the whole results.
However, these preliminary results do not confirm precisely the overconfidence effect which is primarily based on differences between the two sub-samples and the pre-and post-announcement periods. Moreover, they suggest that the main effect could be produced by the GWWO magnitude considering the WO/FA difference between the two groups. For the whole sample the correlation coefficient between WO/FA and UNCINDEX is -0,36 (significant at 5% level) suggesting that GWWOs have been larger for the high-U group. In the next paragraphs, we analyze the overconfidence effect, then control for the GWWO size effect and discuss alternative explanations.
The overconfidence effect
According to our hypothesis, the overconfidence effect implies a mispricing before the announcement (with large negative abnormal returns), followed by a slow correction (large positive abnormal returns). For the low-uncertainty group, no mispricing is expected. So, the first test is driven by abnormal returns differences between the two groups (reported in table 3) and the second test by differences between the pre-and post-announcement periods (reported in table 4).
[table 3 here]
Abnormal returns differences between the two groups are significant as shown in Table   3 and in line with our hypothesis. Investors' overconfidence in their private information produces a strong mispricing difference during the pre-announcement period (-19,57%) which is reversed during the post-announcement period (+19,43%). The negative abnormal return difference observed at the announcement date (-4,03%) seems to confirm the effect of self-attribution bias. Moreover, control variables indicate that the abnormal returns differences between the two groups are related to uncertainty and are not related to GWWO size or firm size.
The most important effect of overconfidence is return reversal, but we also observe an important shift in volatility. Table 4 reports the evolution of returns and volatility over the pre-and post-announcement period. Results confirm the hypothesis: return reversal and volatility decrease are only (and strongly) observed for the high-U sub-sample. One year after the announcement, mispricing seems to persist (the reversal only partially balances the initial overreaction).
[table 4 here] GWWO size effect
We hypothesize that investors' anticipation (and overreaction due to overconfidence) produces our results. But GWWOs size could explain investors' anticipation (BH250-) if investors' investigation is driven by an initial intuition about firms' bad acquisition policy. GWWOs size could also causes abnormal returns at the announcement (AR-1).
Moreover, if uncertainty boosts managers' hubris 4 , impairment losses might be larger in the high-uncertainty sub-sample, reinforcing the magnitude of market reaction and the difference between the two sub-samples. Even if no intuition really supports the relationship between GWWOs size and long-run reversal that we observe, we test its effect as an alternative explanation. GWWOs could produce our results if larger
GWWOs characterized the high-U sub-sample and if abnormal returns are related to GWWOs size. 
where abnormal returns AR are respectively AR-1, BH250-and BH250+ (three regressions) and U is a dummy variable which equals one for the high-U sub-sample and zero for the low-U sub-sample. If GWWO size determines abnormal returns for the whole sample or for the high-U sub-sample β 1 or β 2 should be significant. In particular β 2 should be negative for AR-and BH250-, and positive for BH250+. Table 5 reports results and shows no significance. Thus, there is no evidence that GWWOs size drives our results.
[table 5 here] Uncertainty and managerial motives for GWWOs disclosure
In table 1 comments, we notice that the pre-annoucement negative abnormal returns could create a special situation where managers choose to recognize impairment losses 4 The effects of managerial hubris on acquisitions policies have been tested by Malmendier and Tate (2003) who shows a higher propensity to undertake acquisitions (in particular diversified ones) and a negative relationship between hubris and abnormal returns.
after a prolonged period of market underperformance. Information uncertainty can create incentives for signaling and then it is possible that managers, observing mispricing, would decide to reveal their anticipation about firms' prospect. They observe underpricing due to investors' excessively bad anticipations and decide to signal correct prospects (i.e. bad prospects but not so bad). Our pre-announcement returns (BH250-) and volatility decrease for high-U group could support this story. But, if investors react in an unbiased manner, the mispricing should disappear at the announcement or, at least, during a short period after it. Moreover, if the GWWO is chosen as a signal by managers (for its ability to reveal correct prospects) and if investors rationally react upon it, we should observe a relationship between postannouncement returns and the magnitude of the write-off. Our results do not support the signaling argument.
Conclusion
This article examines the link between uncertainty and investors' reaction to goodwill write-offs. Our theoretical setting is derived from Daniel et al. [1998] who posit that overconfidence leads to an overreaction to private information, followed by too little adjustments when the information becomes public and then a long adjustment which reduce slowly the mispricing in the long run. Our results, firstly, confirm DHS98 model and, indirectly, that overconfidence is boosted by uncertainty. We identify a particular corporate event -here a bad signal: goodwill write-offs -and a particular context -high uncertainty -that fit DHS98 model, allowing private information prospecting, overconfidence in this information and arbitrage obstacles. Our tests confirm the overconfidence effect on investors' reaction: the high-uncertainty sample is characterized by strongly negative abnormal returns during the period preceding GWWOs announcement, associated with high volatility. At the announcement date, negative abnormal returns are observed in line with the self-attribution bias effect (the overreaction is strengthened by a confirming signal). The overreaction to private information is corrected in the long run, where we observe positive abnormal returns, creating a reversal. Secondly, our results show different market reactions to GWWOs according to the level of firm uncertainty and hence provides new insights about informativeness and timeliness of corporate voluntary disclosure. For our sample, SD represents standard deviation of analysts' forecasts and NB the number of analysts supplying a forecast. These data are extracted for the month prior to the earnings announcement preceding the GWWO disclosure. VOL250-is the standard deviation of the raw returns from 10 days to 250 days before the event date. UNCINDEX is the equally weighted average of the ranks of these three variables calculated for each firm. The median decile is excluded. A low value of UNINDEX represents a high information uncertainty.
Table 2: Samples -descriptive statistics
Panel A, B, and C present statistics for respectively the whole sample (62 firms), the high uncertainty group (28 firms) and the low uncertainty group (29 firms). AR-1 represents abnormal return at the day -1, BH250+, the cumulative buy-and-hold returns calculated from 2 days to 250 days after the event date, BH250-, the cumulative buy-and-hold returns calculated from 2 days to 250 days before the event date, WO/FA, the amount of write-off over the fixed assets measured at the fiscal-end year of the event year, MV, the market value of the equity at the last fiscalend year of the observation period, UNCINDEX, the information uncertainty index. The value of non parametric test is reported for the short run performance (Corrado test) and for the long run performance (Wilcoxon test). *, ** represent statistical significance respectively at the 10% and 5% level. Table 3 : Differences in abnormal returns between high-and low-uncertainty groups AR-1 represents abnormal return at the day -1, BH250+, the cumulative buy-and-hold returns calculated from 2 days to 250 days after the event date, BH250-, the cumulative buy-and-hold returns calculated from 2 days to 250 days before the event date, WO/FA, the amount of write-off over the fixed assets measured at the fiscal-end year of the event year, MV, the market value of the equity at the last fiscal-end year of the observation period, UNCINDEX, the information uncertainty index. *, ** represent statistical significance respectively at the 10% and 5% level. Table 4 : Shift in abnormal returns and volatility for the high-and low-uncertainty groups before and after the write-off announcement BH250+ is the cumulative buy-and-hold returns calculated from 2 days to 250 days after the event date, BH250-, the cumulative buy-and-hold returns calculated from 2 days to 250 days before the event date, VOL250+, the standard deviation of the raw returns from 10 days to 250 days after the event date, VOL250-, the standard deviation of the raw returns from 10 days to 250 days before the event date. *, ** represent statistical significance respectively at the 10% and 5% level.
